Mechanism design is concerned with settings where a policy maker (or social planner) faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective (or social), system-wide decision. One of the most important ways for aggregation preference used in a multi agent system is using election. In an election, the aim is to select the candidate who reects the common will of the whole society. Despite the importance of this subject, in the real world situations, sometimes under special circumstances, the result of the election is completely an antithesis of the purpose of those who execute it or the election leads to the dissatisfaction of a large amount of people. For analyzing these situations, a notion is discussed in the present paper called social disappointment and then new protocols are proposed to prevent social disappointment. A version of the impossibility theorem is stated and proved regarding social disappointment in elections. In the end, the numerical results obtained by simulating the voting protocols of plurality and Hare system are given, to show that Hare system is a little more seccessful than plurality to prevent social disappointment.
INTRODUCTION
In social sciences, there are some kinds of social choices: voting which is used to make political decisions, market mechanism which is used as a tool to make economic decisions (Arrow 1950) , auctions, lotteries, authoritative decisions, and etc. The present paper is merely concerned with voting procedures.
Social Choice Theory is concerned with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making (Suzumura 2002) . Voting procedures are among the most important methods for collective decision making. Voting procedures focus on the aggregation of individuals' preferences to produce collective decisions. In practice, a voting procedure is characterized by ballot responses and the way ballots are tallied to determine winners. Voters are assumed to have clear preferences over candidates (alternatives) and attempt to maximize satisfaction with the election outcome by their ballot responses. Voting procedures are formalized by social choice functions, which map ballot response profiles into election outcomes (Brams and Fishburn 2002: 175 ).
Social Choice procedures
There exists a broad class of social choice functions as Condorcet method, Plurality rule, Hare system, Borda count, Sequential Pairwise Voting with a Fixed Agenda (Seq. Pairs), and Dictatorship. Condorcet method is typically attributed to the Marquis de Condorcet; however, it dates back to Ramon Llull in the thirteenth century (Taylor 2008: 6) . The social choice procedure known as Condorcet's method tries to take advantage of the success enjoyed by the majority rule when there are only two alternatives. It does this by seeking an alternative that would, on the basis of the individual preference lists, defeat (or tie) every other alternative if the election had been between these two alternatives. Thus, with Condorcet's method, an alternative 'x' is among the winners if for every other alternative 'y', at least half of the voters rank 'x' over 'y' on their ballots.
Hare procedure was introduced by Thomas Hare in 1861, and is also known by names such as the "Single Transferable Vote System" (STV) or "Instant Runoff Voting" (Taylor 2008: 7) . Jean Charles Chevalier de Borda introduced an aggregation procedure (Borda 1781) known as Borda count. Interestingly, recent historical works by McLean and Urken (McLean and Urken 1993), and Pukelsheim (unpublished) reveal that Bordas' system had been explicitly described in 1433 by Nicholas of Cusa, a Renaissance scholar interested in the question of how German kings should be elected (Taylor 2005: 9) . For more details and examples, see (Taylor 2008: 5-10 ).
Desirable properties
There are five famous desirable properties that relate to voting procedures; Always-AWinner Condition (AAW), Condorcet Winner Criterion (CWC), Pareto Condition, Monotonicity (Mono), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). A social choice procedure is said to satisfy AAW condition if for every sequence of individual preference lists, the procedure outputs at least one winner. An alternative 'x' is said to be a Condorcet winner if it is the unique winner in Condorcet's method. A social choice procedure is said to satisfy CWC provided that-if there is a Condorcet winner-then the output of the procedure would be the Condorcet winner. A social choice procedure is said to satisfy Pareto condition (or just Pareto) if the following holds true for every pair of 'x' and 'y' alternatives. If all the voters prefer 'x' to 'y', then 'y' is not a social choice. A social choice procedure is said to be monotone provided that the following holds true for every alternative 'x': If 'x' is a social choice and someone changes his or her preference list by moving 'x' up, then 'x' should still be the social choice. A social choice procedure satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition whenever the group ranking between 'x' and 'y' depends solely on the individual rankings of 'x' and 'y'. I.e. if all individuals rank 'x' and 'y' in the way in two profiles R and T, then the resulting ranking between 'x' and 'y' should be the same in R and T. The condition of "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" was first used by Arrow (Arrow 1950) . For more details of these properties see (Taylor 2008: 10-13 ).
Social Disappointment
In social choice theory, it is emphasized that the result of one election must reflect the general will of voters. For this reason, in social choice theory, there are different and various criteria for efficiency of voting protocols. However, despite the importance of this argument, in the real world situations sometimes the winner of the election is the one who causes a vast dissatisfaction in the society and leads it to polarization. For the importance of this reason and avoiding the above catastrophes, the present paper introduces one new criterion called-social disappointment, and analyzes and defines it from two different viewpoints. The reason behind social disappointment it is to prevent extremist candidates from being selected and avoid situations in which the election results lead to a vast dissatisfaction in the voter's society.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, a new criterion for voting protocols called Social Disappointment (S.D.) is proposed from two different viewpoints. This section also shows which protocols can avoid S.D. in elections. In section 3, by considering social disappointment in election, an appropriate impossibility theorem is proved and new protocols named L.U and L.U.R are introduced and the proposed new criteria is argued for them. In section 4, the numerical results obtained from the implementation of the plurality rule and the Hare system through C# programming language are presented, the numerical results show that Hare system is a little more successful to prevent social disappointment.
SOCIAL DISAPPOINTMENT IN VOTING PROTOCOLS FROM TWO DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS
In this section the new notion of social disappointment in voting procedures is proposed from two perspectives. To clarify social disappointment we start by the following example. Example 2.1 Consider the following situation in which there are four Dutchmen, three Germans, and two Frenchmen who have to decide on which drink to be served for lunch (only a single drink will be served to all). Now, which drink should be served based on these individuals' preferences? Milk could be chosen since it has the most agents ranking it first. Milk is the winner according to the plurality rule, which only considers how often each alternative is ranked in the first place. However, the majority of agents will be dissatisfied with this choice as they prefer any other drink to Milk. For such an occasion in terms of social choice theory one can say that the Condorcet Loser-in this example milk-is the social choice and this, on its own, is one of the undesirable situations in the social choice theory.
Now to look at it from another perspective, Milk is the alternative which is at the bottom of more than half of the voters' preferences lists. As a matter of fact in such situations social choice is an alternative with the least social support and has the most social dissatisfaction or to be even more serious has the most social resentment.■
The following part of this section attends to the concept of social disappointment in voting from the two mentioned perspectives about the outputs of a procedure: 1) the output is Condorcet Loser and 2) the output is at the bottom of at least half of the voters' preferences lists (in other words, if we let n be the percent of preferences lists which the output is at the bottom of them then n ≥ 50%).
The two above notions are logically independent and none of them is the result of the other one (pay attention to the term "at least half of" and see proposition 2.8).
Social Disappointment and Condorcet Loser Condition
As mentioned in the previous example, in social choice theory there is a phrase called Condorcet Loser. What follows is an exact and detailed definition of this phrase and the Condorcet Loser condition.
Definition 2.2
We say that an alternative is a Condorcet Loser if it would be defeated by every other alternative in a kind of one-on-one contest that takes place in a sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda. Further, we say that a social choice procedure satisfies the Condorcet Loser criterion provided that a Condorcet Loser is never among the social choices.
Remark 2.3 From the definition of Condorcet Loser it is clear that if existed would be unique.
Grofman and Feld point out in their article (Grofman and Feld 2004 ) that picking such an alternative as the winner was a poor voting method, indeed. After so in the real political situation, it is shown that plurality rule can have this flaw.
In a well-known three-way US Senatorial contest in the State of New York in 1970, the candidate running on the Conservative party line (Buckley) was arguably a Condorcet Loser in that he would have lost in head-to-head general election contest with either the Democrat (Otinger) or the liberal Republican (Goodell). Yet it was this Conservative Party candidate who won the general election with a plurality vote despite his more liberal opponents having accumulated about 60% of the vote between them. Although the liberal Republicans are a minority among the Republican voters, most liberal Republicans preferred Goodell to Buckley, and in a general election pitting Buckley against Goodell they would have been joined by a high proportion of the Democrats who would also have clearly preferred the liberal Goodell to the conservative Buckley. On the other hand, while Otinger, a Democrat, might not have done as well as Goodell among liberal Republicans in a head-to-head contest with Buckley, he would have made up for that by getting virtually all the Democratic vote. We can see this as a situation involving single-peaked preferences where the two liberal candidates (Goodell and Otinger) split the liberal vote, allowing the least preferred choice among a majority of the voters to win (Grofman and Feld 2004) .
To consider preventing such events from occurrence the present paper defines the concept of Social Disappointment in Voting with regard to the Condorcet Loser criteria as follows: To prevent such Social Disappointment in Voting, it is recommended to use the voting protocols of Condorcet, Borda Count Rule or Seq. Pairs.
Social Disappointment in Voting from the Second Perspective
Some civilizations live in a way that the racial/ethnic/religious divisions can potentially cause polarization in the society. In situations where centrism is defined in terms of conciliatory views, the necessity of choosing the moderate candidates and keeping away from the extremist candidates-who are not supported by a broad spectrum of people-will be shown clearly. From this aspect the concept of Social Disappointment in Voting is defined as follows: Definition 2.5 Social disappointment in voting happens when the outcome of a voting system (for 3 or more alternatives) occurs for those alternatives which are at the end of at least half of the individual preference profiles. 
Remark 2.7
If more than half of the voters in any election put 'a' at the top of their individual preference lists then, for sure, 'a' will be the social choice and in this case social disappointment will not occur.
Proposition 2.8
The definitions given for social disappointment in voting from two points of view are completely different; the occurrence of one of them never guarantees that of the other. Obviously, 'a' is the Condorcet loser but, he is not at the end of at least half of the individual preference lists. Therefore, if one protocol (for instance L.U. protocol which will be introduce) considers 'a' as the winner of the social selection, despite its being the Condorcet loser, the second kind of S.D. will not occur.
The main question here is that whether any of the given protocols in this article prevent S.D in voting? Generally, the answer is said to be no. This issue is addressed below in more detail.
Lemma 2.9
The Plurality rule does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. See Example 2.1.
Lemma 2.10
The Borda count rule can always prevent S.D in voting except in one case. In this case the social choice set will consist of all the alternatives. The alternatives 'a', 'b' and 'c' are the social choice when the Borda count procedure is used. Although 'a' is the social choice (also 'c'), it is at the bottom of half of individual preference lists and so social disappointment has taken place.
Note that there are 'k' candidates (k ≥ 3) and 'n' voters (n ≥ 3). The total sum of scores in Borda count rule is equal to:
Now consider that 'n' is an odd number, without loss of generality, and also consider that is a social choice and there is S.D. in voting, so must be at least the last preference in of individual preferences lists. Now consider the most optimistic possibility that in of the remaining lists is at the top. Thus Borda score for the alternative equals: . Now if this amount is subtracted from the whole Borda score it gives:
Now if, in the most optimistic possibility, the remaining score is again shared among the other k -1 candidate equally, the amount of Borda score for every other candidate is which clearly is more than Borda score for , and this is against being the social choice. In the end if the number of voters is an odd number and voting is done according to Borda count rule, S.D. will definitely not occur. Now consider that 'n' is an even number, without loss of generality and also consider that is a social choice and there is S.D. in voting. So, in the most optimistic possibility, Borda score for is equal to:
. Now, if this amount is subtracted from the whole Borda score gives:
If, in the most optimistic possibility, the remaining score again shared among the other k-1
candidates equally, the amount of Borda score for every other candidate would be which is clearly equal to the Borda score for and thus the social choice set consists of all the candidates. Otherwise, if the remaining score is shared among every other candidate, can no longer be the social choice according to Borda count rule. The reason is that there is at least one candidate that has a score higher than that of .■ Lemma 2.11 The Hare procedure does not prevent social disappointment. The alternatives 'a' and 'c' are the social choice set when the Hare system is used. Although 'a' is a the social choice, it is at the bottom of half of the individual preference lists and so social disappointment has taken place.■ Lemma 2.12 Sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. Consider the three alternatives 'b', 'c', and 'a' and suppose that this ordering of the alternatives is also the agenda. Consider the following sequence of four preference lists grouped into voting blocks of size two, one, and one:
Voters Voter Voter The alternatives 'a' and 'b' are social choices when Seq. Pairs is used. Although 'a' is a social choice, but it is at the bottom of half of the individual preference lists and so social disappointment has taken place.■ Lemma 2.13 A dictatorship does not prevent social disappointment.
Proof. It is clear.■
Lemma 2.14 If in Condorcet method more than half of voters put 'a' at the bottom of individual preference lists then for sure 'a' would not be a social choice and in this case social disappointment would not occur. But if the number of voters is even and precisely half of the voters put 'a' at the end of their lists, one of these two possibilities will happen:
(1) Not all the voters in the other half put 'a' at the top of their lists, in which case, 'a' won't definitely be a social choice and social disappointment won't occurs. (2) All the voters in the other half also put 'a' at the top of their lists, in which case 'a' will definitely be in the set of social choices and therefore social disappointment occurs.
Proof. It is concluded from the definitions.■

Remark 2.15
Regarding case 2 in Lemma 2.14 if there are only three alternatives, the set of social choices will certainly have more than one member.
As observable none of the famous procedures mentioned in this article prevent social disappointment. A procedure which prevents social disappointment in voting is Coombs method (Coombs rule) has been introduced by the famous psychologist Clyde Coombs (Coombs 1964 ). This procedure starts with deleting the alternative or alternatives occurring at the bottom of most of the lists. At this stage we have lists that are at least one alternative shorter than the lists we started with. Now, we simply repeat this procedure of deleting the least public resentment alternative or alternatives. The alternative(s) deleted last is declared as the winner.
Remark 2.16
Suppose that there is a candidate that is at the end of at least half of the preference profiles. The Coombs' procedure deletes this alternative from the profile lists in the first stage and does not let this candidate be elected, so social disappointment cannot occur for this alternative.
Which properties does this procedure satisfy? The answer is given in the following Grofman and Feld in their article (Grofman and Feld 2004) have shown that many conclusions suggested as a justification for getting replaced by those supporting Hare system can be used as even stronger and more accurate evidences for Coombs' procedure rather than the plurality rule. They also argue, in another place in their article, that the supporters of the Hare system, like Donald Horowitz, have proven that when the Hare system is used the probability of a moderate candidate's winning the election instead of an extremist is higher than that when the plurality rule is used. A moderate candidate here refers to the one who has the support of most of the voters but is not their first priority, and an extremist here refers to the candidate who is the first priority of many voters but loses ballot in one or more one-on-one competitions with the other candidates. The influence and permeation of Horowitz's idea is proven in places such as Fiji and Guinea new Papua. The result obtained by considering this section is that in societies in which racial, religious and ethnical conflicts can potentially lead to polarization, if the purpose of election's organizers is to prevent this situation and to help with electing a moderate politician, noticing social dissatisfaction is highly necessary. It seems that in such situations it is essential to use protocols like Coombs procedure which is in line with this intention.
Remark 2.17
What needs to be highlighted is that if in social disappointment in the second viewpoint instead of using the expression "at least half of" one uses the phrase "more than the half of", then a new definition of social disappointment will be obtained called "strict social disappointment". With a little attention, it becomes obvious that the Condorcet's method, the Borda count rule, the Seq. Pairs and the Coombs' procedure can avoid S.D.
It is clear that the occurrence of strict social disappointment will result in both defined S.Ds. But, the reverse may not hold true.
A GLIMPSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Taylor proved in (Taylor 1997 ) also (Taylor 2008: 28-31 ) that there is no social choice procedure for three or more alternatives that satisfies the Always-A-Winner criterion, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and the Condorcet Winner Criterion. What follows is to prove an impossibility theorem based on the social disappointment concept (from the second point of view). Proof. It is assumed that there is a social choice procedure which satisfies the Condorcet Winner Criterion. It will be shown below that if this procedure is applied to the profile that consists of the Condorcet's voting paradox (Condorcet 1785) , then it produces a winner which will lead to social disappointment. This claim can be proved for when there are four alternatives.
Suppose that there is a social choice procedure that satisfies the Condorcet's Winner Criterion. Consider the following profile: Proof. It is obvious considering Theorem 3.1.■
Condorcet-with-an-amendment and Seq. Pairs-with-an-amendment procedures.
Before considering the rest of the possible cases, the following two procedures are introduced and their properties are investigated. Notice that the alternative 'b' is still above 'a' in the third voter's list. However, the Least Unpopular procedure now has 'a' and 'b' tied as the winner. Thus, although no one changed his or her preference regarding the alternatives 'a' and 'b', the alternative 'a' changed position from being a non-winner to being a winner. This shows that the independence of irrelevant alternatives fails in the Least Unpopular procedure.■ Proposition 3.9 There are some social choice procedures for three or more alternatives that will satisfy:
a) The nonexistence of the S.D. criterion, the Monotonicity criterion, and the Always-A-Winner criterion.
b) The nonexistence of the S.D. criterion, the Pareto criterion, and the Always-AWinner criterion.
Proof. The Least Unpopular procedure is one of them.■ Now the Least Unpopular Reselection procedure is introduced and investigated. This protocol satisfies the AAW, Monotonicity, and Pareto criteria, and also the nonexistence of the S.D criterion, but does not satisfy the CWC and IIA criteria.
Proposition 3.11
The Least Unpopular Reselection procedure does not satisfy the CWC and IIA criteria.
Proof. Do as was done in the proof of Proposition 3.9.
Proposition 3.12 There are some social choice procedures for three or more alternatives that will satisfy the nonexistence of the S.D. criterion, Pareto, and Monotonicity criteria.
Proof. The L.U.R procedure is one of them.
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND FINAL REMARKS
As mentioned in section 3, the Coombs' rule always prevents the occurrence of the second kind of S.D. It is also proved that the Hare system cannot eschew S.D. in voting. However, by considering the way in which a winner is obtained in this method it seems that in equal situations, the possibility of S.D. is less than that of the plurality rule in this method. The results of implementing the protocols of plurality and Hare system for three candidates and 
Remark 4.1
The noticeable point about implementation is that the only case in which the occurrence of S.D. for three candidates by the plurality rule is less than that by the Hare system is when there are six voters. In other cases, as a result indicate, the Hare system has a better performance in comparison to the plurality rule. The other tangible point one can obtain from these results is that for two sequential numbers, if the numbers of voters is odd the possibility of the occurrence of S.D. in both protocols (especially in the Hare system) reduces drastically in comparison to the time when this number is even.
CONCLUSION
The following table (Table 2 ) summarized the conclusions made in the previous sections:
One of the proposed subjects in the Social Choice theory is that the result of the election must reflect the general will of voters. Therefore, determining efficient criteria and creating protocols which are consistent with those criteria is of high importance. Staying away from choosing the Condorcet's Loser, and from selecting the extremist candidates in potentially polarized societies are tangible criteria which are noticed and emphasized by election systems experts like Horowitz, Guimer, Grofman and Reilly. That is why the concept of S.D. is defined in the present paper from two different viewpoints and then protocols such as Coombs' are introduced or protocols like L.U and L.U.R are designed accordingly to be consistent and in harmony with the above purposes. In conclusion, what one can discern from the above discussion is that if protecting parties and moderate politician are important in a society and are among the goals of the organizers, then considering the concept of S.D. and using protocols such as Coombs, L.U, and L.U.R are necessary and inevitable.
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